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Bouvia v. Superior Court:
The Death Option
In California, individuals have a fundamental right to refuse
medical treatment, even if they may die as a result.' Prior to 1986,
the courts addressed the issue of whether patients could lawfully
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment when they are "terminally
ill, ' ' 2 or require life-support equipment to remain alive.' In Bouvia
v. Superior Court,4 however, the patient was neither terminal nor
in need of mechanical means to stay alive. 5 Elizabeth Bouvia had
severe cerebral palsy6 and was maintained at a public hospital in
Los Angeles County. 7 The medical and dietary staff had determined
that Bouvia was not consuming sufficient nutrients . To counteract
the deficiency, Bouvia was force-fed through a nasogastric tube. 9
Bouvia filed a petition for a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions, requesting that the court enjoin
the hospital and medical staff from force-feeding her.' 0 The lower
court concluded that the nasogastric tube was necessary to prolong
Bouvia's life." In addition, the court found that the state had an
1. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015-16, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 484, 489 (1983); Bartling v. Superior Court (Bartling 1), 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 194,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (1984). There is, however, no right to collect damages from the
physicians and hospital because the patient's demand to refuse medical treatment was not
honored. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (Bartling H1), 184 Cal. App. 3d
961, 971, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364 (1986).
2. A condition which is "terminal" has been defined as: "[an] incurable condition
caused by injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining
procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and where the
application of life-sustaining procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the
patieat." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(0 (West Supp. 1987).
3. For example, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District granted a
request for an order to disconnect the respirator in Bartling 1, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 197
n.8, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226 n.8.
4. 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986), review denied, May 21, 1986.
5. Id. at 1135-36, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
6. Id.
7. Bouvia was being maintained at High Desert Hospital, in Lancaster, California.
The hospital is maintained and staffed by the County of Los Angeles. Rust, Courts Rule
on Feeding: Quadriplegic'sRefusal Upheld, AM. MED. NEWS, May 2, 1986, at I, col. 3.
8. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
9. Id. A nasogastric tube is "a stomach tube passed through the nose." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1495 (5th Unab. Law. ed. 1982).
10. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
11. Id.
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interest in preserving life, rather than in providing the means for
terminating life.' 2 The court of appeal reversed. Relying on earlier
appellate rulings, the court held that a noncomatose patient, diagnosed as likely to live for fifteen to twenty years, 3 has the right to
refuse any medical treatment, even if doing so creates a life4
threatening condition.1
Part I of this note summarizes the Bouvia decision."5 The legal

background of the right to refuse medical treatment is examined in
part

11.16

Finally, part III discusses the possible ramifications of the

17
opinion in Bouvia.

I.
A.

TBE CASE

The Facts

Elizabeth Bouvia is a twenty-eight year old quadriplegic who has
suffered from cerebral palsy since birth.' 8 With the exception of

two fingers, she is unable to move any part of her body below her
neck.' 9 Bouvia's condition leaves her in continuous pain for which
she requires morphine periodically injected into her chest through
a permanently attached tube.20
Since 1983, Bouvia has been attempting to enforce her asserted

right to receive pain-killing medications while refusing nourishment. 2' Bouvia first made her request after she arranged for a
voluntary psychiatric admission to Riverside General Hospital. 22
Shortly after her admission, Bouvia disclosed her intention to stop
eating and to die of starvation. 23 Bouvia also requested that the
hospital staff continue to provide pain medication and hygienic care

12. Id. at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
13. At the time of the appellate decision, Elizabeth Bouvia was 28 years old. The trial
court found that Bouvia had the physical capacity to live an additional 15 to 20 years. Id.
at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (noting that
because Bouvia was found to be able to live for an additional number of years, the
determination of her fate should be measured by the quality of life for those years).
14. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
15. See infra notes 18-80 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 81-183 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 184-225 and accompanying text.
18. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
19. Id. at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Cox, Disabled Woman's Request to Die Raises Legal Furor, L.A. Daily J.,
Dec. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
23. Id.
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until her death. 24 Bouvia indicated that she no longer wished to live
because of her disability, and that she required their assistance
because the disability rendered her physically unable to commit

suicide. 25
The hospital administration informed Bouvia that when her body

weight fell below a certain level, steps would be taken to force-feed
her. 26 Bouvia filed a petition with the Superior Court of Riverside
County requesting that the court enjoin the hospital from force-

feeding or discharging her. 27 The court issued an order enjoining
the hospital from discharging Bouvia against her will, but refused

to enjoin the force-feeding.28 Bouvia checked out of Riverside
29
Hospital and abandoned an appeal of the ruling.

Attempts to find a suitable facility or residence of her own proved
difficult.3 0 Because Bouvia was without means of financial support,
she was limited to facilities that accepted patients receiving public
assistance."' Eventually, Bouvia was admitted to 32High Desert Hospital, a public hospital in Lancaster, California.
The medical staff of High Desert Hospital was aware of Bouvia's
33
previous desire to starve herself to death. Fearing that her weight

loss might reach a life-threatening level, Bouvia's physicians inserted

34
a nasogastric tube to carry nutrients to her stomach. The tube was
35

inserted against her will and contrary to her written instructions.
Once again, Bouvia obtained legal assistance to contest a medical

24. Id.
25. See Note, Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hospital: Suicide, Euthanasia, Murder:
The Line Blurs, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 407 (1985) (discussion of Bouvia's initial
attempt to assert her right to refuse medical treatment). The Note includes a projection of
the negative implications that a court ruling to permit Bouvia to starve to death in the
hospital would have upon those members of society who live with physical disabilities. Id.
at 414-31.
26. Id. at 407.
27. Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780 (Super. Ct. Riverside Dec. 16, 1983).
28. Id.
29. See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
30. Id.
31. Id. Bouvia's maintenance in a public facility raised the issue of whether the staff
of a public facility had a greater right to impede Bouvia's autonomy because the state
would, in theory, become a party to her actions and the state has a strong interest in
preserving the lives of its citizens. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
32. Id. at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. See also Rust, Courts Rule on Feeding:
Quadriplegic'sRefusal Upheld, AM. MED. NEws, May 2, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
33. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
34. Id.
35. Her instructions were dictated to her lawyers, written by them, and signed by her
by means of her making a feeble "x" on the paper with a pen which she held in her mouth.
Id. at 1136 n.2, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300 n.2.
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decision. The trial court declined to issue a preliminary injunction
requiring removal of the nasogastric tube and prohibiting the in-

sertion of other similar devices without her consent.3 6 Bouvia's
appeal of that decision is the subject of this note.

B.

The Opinion
The court of appeal in Bouvia held that the right to refuse

medical treatment is basic and fundamental, and is recognized as a
part of the right to privacy protected by both the state and federal

constitutions. 37 The court next examined whether that right applies
to the rejection of life-sustaining treatment, especially when the

desire to disconnect life-support equipment is met with objections
by the patient's physicians and hospital. 38 American courts have
long held that a patient has the right to refuse medical treatment,
even when doing so presents a risk to the patient's health or life.3 9
Prior to Bouvia, California courts had addressed the right to refuse

life-sustaining medical treatment with regard to patients who were
close to death, 40 or had been diagnosed as terminal or comatose."'
36. Id. at 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
37. Id. at 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301. Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution
states as follows: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of
privacy is a penumbra of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of the United
States Constitution. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
38. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1138, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
39. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972) (action to require a
necessary blood transfusion for a patient who refused on religious grounds); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (action to disconnect a respirator from a 73 year
old man who suffered from Lou Gehrig's Disease); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d
115 (1980) (action to withdraw hemodialysis treatment from a 70 year old man suffering
from permanent and irreversible kidney disease and senility); Superintendent of Belchertown
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (action to discontinue chemotherapy
treatments of a mentally retarded leukemia victim); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377,
376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978) (action to require the amputation of a gangrenous leg);
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (action for removal of a nasogastric
feeding tube from an 84 year old woman with serious and irreversible physical and mental
impairments); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978) (action to
require the amputation of both legs due to a gangrenous condition); Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (action for damages following an
unconsented surgery to remove a fibroid tumor).
40. Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220. See infra notes 125-37 and
accompanying text (discussion of Bartling 1).
41. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (criminal
action against two physicians who, at the family's request, removed all life-support devices
from a comatose patient). See infra notes 104-18 and accompanying text (discussion of
Barber).
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The court in Bouvia affirmed a previous appellate ruling that stated
42
that the right to refuse medical treatment also applies to competent
patients who would prefer death to a life sustained by life-support
devices. 43 The right allows competent and informed patients to
determine their own fates. 44
The appellate court holding is particularly significant because the
trial court found that, with sufficient nourishment, Bouvia could
live an additional fifteen to twenty years. 45 The court of appeal
found the trial court's measurement of Bouvia's life solely on
quantitative terms to be in error. 46 Instead the court reasoned that
the proper determination must give at least equal weight to the
quality of a patient's life. 47 If a patient is denied the right to refuse
medical treatment because a court, a physician, or an ethics committee has decided that the patient might continue to live for a
certain period of time, the right effectively loses all value and
48
meaning.
Bouvia was a patient in a public facility which, according to the
hospital, makes the state a party to acts and omissions of the
hospital and its staff.49 In defense of their decision to maintain the
nasogastric tube, the physicians and administrators of the hospital
0
asserted the interests of the state in preserving life, preventing
5
2
and maintaining the
suicide, 5' protecting innocent third parties

42. Bouvia was found competent to choose her medical treatment because she was not
incapacitated by age, unconciousness, mental disease, or disability. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App.
3d at 1141, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
43. Id. at 1138, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (citing Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 220-21). Bouvia was not, however, dependent upon a machine to continue
living. Bouvia objected to the use of a device of modern technology which would forcefeed her. Id. at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
44. Id. at 1138, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
45. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. The physicians and administrators of the hospital
noted that Bouvia was not terminal, as was Herbert, Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 486, nor near death, as was Bartling, Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 192,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223. Because Bouvia had a prognosis of continuing to live for several
years, her decision appeared to be less a decision to terminate life-support systems than a
decision to starve herself to death. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at
304.
46. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
49. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Courts have supported judicial intervention to compel medical treatment when
the patient is the parent of a minor child, based on an extension of the parens patriae
doctrine. This doctrine refers traditionally to the role of a state as sovereign and guardian
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ethical integrity of the medical profession.5 3 Despite the legitimacy
of these objectives, the court held that if the right of self-determi-

nation was to have any meaning at all, that right must be paramount
4
to the asserted state interests.5
Another issue addressed by the court concerned Bouvia's request

for medical treatment in the form of pain-killers.5 5 The hospital

argued that the request precluded Bouvia from accepting medical

treatment such as morphine injections, while simultaneously rejecting other essential treatment such as nutrition.5 6 Because Bouvia
was without funds to enter a private hospital, she was compelled
to remain under the care of the public hospital.57 Although her stay
was obligatory upon the hospital, the court held that the hospital
could not refuse or deny Bouvia's request to be relieved from pain

and suffering by morphine injection merely because she had refused

nasogastric feeding.5 8 The choice to refuse nasogastric feeding was

found to be an exercise of Bouvia's fundamental right to protect
what little privacy remained to her.5 9
Next, the court discussed the lower court's denial of relief on the
suicide issue. 60 Bouvia's physicians and the hospital administration
asserted that Bouvia was attempting to commit suicide in their
facility. 61 The trial court noted that Bouvia claimed that she did
of persons under legal disability. See West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1089 (2nd Cir. 1971). Since the state can generally act to safeguard a child's welfare, the
state can act to prevent the ultimate abandonment of a child by the parent's self-destruction.
See also In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (court ordered blood transfusions over
a patient's religious objections when she had to care for a seven month old child).
53. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. The court noted that the
maintenance of ethical standards of the medical profession includes "the right of physicians
to effectively render necessary and appropriate medical service and to refuse treatment to
an uncooperative and disruptive patient." Id.
54. Id. at 1141, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
55. The trial court found that Bouvia had "purposefully engaged in a selective rejection
of medical treatment and nutritional intake to accomplish her objective and accept only
treatment which gives her some degree of comfort pending her demise." Id. at 1144, 225
Cal. Rptr. at 305.
56. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
57. Id. at 1136, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
58. Id. at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305. Currently, no state, including California, has a
statute making a successful suicide a crime, nor does the Model Penal Code recognize suicide
as a crime. At common law, attempted suicide was a criminal act. A few American
jurisdictions have adopted this view, but most, including California, impose no criminal
penalty for a suicide attempt. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 433, 667 P.2d 1176, 1178,
194 Cal. Rptr. 163, 165 (1983). See infra notes 143-83 and accompanying text (discussion
of suicide).
61. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
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not wish to commit suicide. 62 Nevertheless, the trial court drew a
"reasonable inference" from Bouvia's request to reject nutritional
intake and concluded that Bouvia was motivated by a desire to end
her life. 63 Agreeing with the position taken by the physicians and
hospital administration, the trial court found that the removal of
the nasogastric tube would therefore impede the well-recognized
64
state interest in preserving the sanctity of life.
Although the court of appeal noted that suicide is probably the
ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy, the court disagreed with
the trial court's conclusion for other reasons .65 In 1983, when Bouvia
had the specific intent to commit suicide, she did not do S0.66 The
appellate court reasoned that because Bouvia's condition had worsened to the point at which she no longer had the ability to independently consume nutrients, her decision to withdraw from the
nasogastric feedings should be construed merely as a choice of an
earlier death without force-feeding. 67
Another question arose as to whether the hospital and its staff
would be aiding and abetting suicide by discontinuing treatment as6
s
Bouvia requested, if Bouvia was truly attempting to kill herself.
The trial court found that Bouvia's desire to terminate her life
69
required the assistance of the hospital staff. The staff would assist
Bouvia's suicide by furnishing medical treatment to which she
consented, and refraining from administering treatment which she
refused. 70 Because Bouvia resided in a state-supported hospital and
relied upon public assistance for her maintenance, the hospital

62. Id. The trial court went on to state that Bouvia had voiced her desire to die to a
staff member of the hospital. On that evidence, the court found the claim that she did not
wish to commit suicide to be merely a semantic distinction. Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at
305-06.
63. Id. The trial court based its finding that Bouvia had purposefully engaged in a
selective rejection of medical treatment and nutritional intake on the fact that she would
accept only treatment which gave her some degree of comfort pending her demise. See supra
note 55.
64. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. See supra note 31.
65. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
66. Id. The court pointed out that in 1983, Bouvia apparently had the ability, without
artificial aids, to consume enough nutrients to sustain herself. Id.
67. Id. Furthermore, the appellate court took issue with the trial court's emphasis on
the motives behind Bouvia's decision to refuse medical treatment. The appellate court stated
that: "[i]f a right [to refuse medical treatment] exists, it matters not what 'motivates' its
exercise." Id.
68. Id. California Penal Code § 401 makes aiding and abetting suicide a felony in
California. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1970). See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
69. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
70. Id.
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advanced the argument that permitting Bouvia to terminate lifesustaining treatment would effectively make the state a party to her
7
suicide. 1
The court of appeal disagreed with the trial court's determination
that the medical staff would be assisting suicide by adhering to
Bouvia's request to stop force-feeding her. 72 The appellate court
acknowledged an interest in preserving the sanctity of life, but went
on to clarify the distinction between aiding and abetting suicide and
merely being present while a patient exercises a constitutional right
to privacy. 73 Aiding and abetting suicide presupposes an affirmative
act on the part of the person charged with the crime.7 4 The court
offered the example of one who provides the instrumentality or
other means by which another could immediately and physically
self-inflict a fatal injury. 75 Providing an instrumentality is a far
more culpable act than remaining present while a patient exercises
a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. 76 The court of
appeal concluded that no criminal or civil liability would attach to
a doctor or hospital by honoring the refusal of medical treatment
by a competent, informed patient. 77
The court of appeal finally issued a peremptory writ of mandate,
ordering the trial court to immediately grant Bouvia's request for
removal of the nasogastric tube from her body.78 In addition, the
trial court was ordered to prohibit the hospital and medical staff
from replacing the nasogastric tube, or any other similar device, in
or on Bouvia's body without her consent.7 9 Although not stated in
the order, the court, in dicta, also prohibited the hospital from
removing the tube through which Bouvia received morphine injec-

71. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
72. Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
73. Id. at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. Addressing the same issue, the appellate court
in Bartling I stated as follows:
[T]he underlying State interest in this area lies in the prevention of irrational selfdestruction. What we consider here is a competent, rational decision to refuse
treatment when death is inevitable and the treatment offers no hope of cure or
preservation of life. There is no connection between the conduct here in issue and
any State concern to prevent suicide.
Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 226.
74. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1146, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
79. Id.
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tions merely because she chose to reject the nasogastric tube. 0
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The right of individuals to control their own bodies is a basic
8
societal concept, long recognized in the common law. 1 In California, the state supreme court has held that the right to control one's
82
own body includes the right to refuse medical treatment. Initially,
the right to refuse medical treatment was provided to comatose and
terminal patients, 83 but has more recently been extended to competent patients. 84 Arguably, the ultimate exercise of control over
the body is in the deliberate termination of one's life through the
act of suicide.85
A.

The Right To Refuse Medical Treatment

The judiciary has long recognized the right to refuse medical
treatment.8 6 Courts have affirmed this right even when refusal was
life-threatening.8 7 The right to refuse medical treatment is encomprotected by both the
passed in the fundamental right to 8privacy
8
California and federal constitutions.
The right to refuse medical treatment was first recognized by the
California Supreme Court in Cobbs v. Grant.89 During surgery, an

80. Id. at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. The court stated in pertinent part:
We hold only that her right to refuse medical treatment, even of the life-sustaining
variety, entitles her to the immediate removal of the nasogastric tube that has
been involuntarily inserted into her body. The hospital and medical staff are still
free to perform a substantial if not the greater part of their duty, i.e., that of
trying to alleviate Bouvia's pain and suffering.
Id.
81. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Probably the most frequently cited
statement of the right to control one's body is from Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, in which
the United States Supreme Court stated the following: "No right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. Ry., 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891) (refusing to compel a personal injury plaintiff to undergo a pretrial medical examination).
82. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (discussion of Cobbs v. Grant).
83. See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text (discussion of In re Quinlan and
Barber v. Superior Court).
84. See infra notes 125-41 and accompanying text (discussion of Bartling v. Superior
Court and Superintendent of Belkhertown v. Saikewicz).
85. See infra notes 143-83 and accompanying text (discussion of suicide).
86. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
89. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
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artery in the plaintiff's spleen was accidently severed.9 0 Two addi-

tional operations were required to repair the damage. 9' Prior to the
initial surgery, the surgeon explained the nature of the operation

to Cobbs, but did not discuss any of the inherent risks of the

surgery. 92 Cobbs brought medical malpractice actions against the
surgeon and the hospital, based on the theory that a physician has

a duty to disclose to the patient all facts necessary to allow the
patient to intelligently consent to the proposed treatment. 93 The

California Supreme Court held that "a person of adult years and
in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control over his own
body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical
treatment.

' 94

Although the holding of Cobbs related to an action-

able battery in the absence of informed consent, the relevance of
Cobbs to Bouvia lies in the affirmation of the patient's right to
determine whether to accept or refuse any medical treatment. Bouvia

sought to enforce her right to limit medical treatment and gain
control over her body, pursuant to the holding in Cobbs.95
1. Refusal of Medical Treatment: Comatose and Terminal
Patients

The seminal case concerning a petition to permit the withdrawal
of all life-sustaining medical treatment from a comatose patient is

In re Quinlan.96 Karen Quinlan suffered from a condition diagnosed

as being chronic, persistent, and vegetative. 97 Doctors agreed that no
cure existed for Quinland.98 On the basis of this prognosis, Quinlan's
guardian petitioned the court to allow him to authorize the termination of all extraordinary procedures sustaining Quinlan's life.99
The court stated that because Quinlan was not competent to decide
90. Id. at 235, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
93. Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
94. Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
95. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300
(1986).
96. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
97. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654.
98. Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655.
99. Id. at 38-39, 355 A.2d at 662-63. The court noted that the record was somewhat
hazy in distinguishing between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" measures, but "one would
have to think that the use of the same respirator or like support could be considered
,ordinary' in the context of the possibly curable patient but 'extraordinary' in the context
of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory processes of an irreversibly doomed patient."
Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
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whether to be maintained on the machines, her guardian could
assert Quinlan's right to privacy on the patient's behalf. 00 By
applying a balancing test, the court in Quinlan determined that the
right of the patient to die should be weighed against the societal
interest in preserving life and the responsibility of a physician to
10
administer medical treatment in accordance with good judgment. '
According to the court, the interest of the state weakens and the
right of the individual to refuse necessary medical treatment grows
as the degree of bodily intrusion increases and the prognosis for
life dims. 0 2 Therefore, the determination of whether to grant a
request to withdraw life-sustaining treatment must focus on the
reasonable possibility of the patient returning to a cognitive, sapient
10
life, as distinguished from a forced biological vegetative existence.
0 4 dealt with
The California case of Barber v. Superior Court'
circumstances similar to those in Quinlan. Clarence Herbert underwent routine abdominal surgery and subsequently suffered a heart
attack. 05 As a result, Herbert entered a deep coma and sustained
1 6 At the
severe brain damage leaving him in a vegetative state.
written request of his family, and based upon Herbert's previous
07
statements that he did not want to be kept alive by machines,1
0 8 Two days
Herbert was removed from all life-support equipment.
after that request, the family ordered the removal of intravenous
0
tubes providing hydration'0 9 and nourishment." Herbert died and
his doctors were charged with murder and conspiracy to commit
murder."'

100. Id. at 38, 355 A.2d at 662.
101. Id. at 40-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
102. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
103. Id.
104. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
105. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. The court found that Herbert, prior to entering
his coma, had expressed to his wife that he would not want to be kept alive by machines or
"become another Karen Ann Quinlan." Id.
108. Id.
109. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIoNARY 662 (5th Unab. Law. ed. 1982) (defining "hydration" as "[cilinically, the taking of water. .. ").
110. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
111. Id. The Barber court noted that historically, death has been defined as the cessation
of respiratory and heart function. Id. at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488. In California, death
is defined as the irreversible cessation of all brain function. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 7180(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987). Herbert was not dead by either historical or statutory

standards as there was some rminimal brain activity at the time medical treatment was
terminated. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1013, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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The court recognized that the Natural Death Act ' 2 permits a
person to execute a directive for the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures in the event that the person later suffers
from a terminal condition. 1 3 The court held that the physicians'
conduct constituted an omission rather than an act." 4 Because the
court did not find that the physicians actively participated in Herbert's death, the doctors were acquitted of all charges." 5 To support
the decision that the physicians did not act illegally by acceding to
the family's wishes, the Barbercourt relied on the Quinlan balancing
test to consider whether the proposed treatment for Herbert was
proportionate to the advancement of state interests in light of the
burdens caused by continued treatment."16 The court agreed with
the Quinlan decision that the focal point of the decision should be
the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of return to cognitive
and sapient life, as balanced against the forced continuance of a
vegetative existence." 7 The court in Barber therefore found that the
omission to continue treatment under the circumstances was not an
unlawful failure to perform a legal duty."'
Both Quinlan and Barber support the conclusion that a patient
has a fundamental right to decide whether to accept or refuse
medical treatment, even when the patient is not presently competent
to make that decision." 9 The Bouvia court stated that in cases like
Quinlan and Barber, when the patient is physically incapable of
making a decision, the person making the decision in the patient's
stead should be guided in the decision by knowledge of the patient's
own desires and feelings, to the extent they were expressed before
the patient became incompetent. 20 The autonomy of the patient is
112. See CAL. HEALTH &
113. See id. at § 7188.
114.

SAFETY CODE

§§ 7185-7195 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).

Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. The court stated as

follows: "In summary we conclude that the [physician's] omission to continue treatment

under the circumstances, though intentional and with knowledge that the patient would die,
was not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
117. Id. (quoting Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669).
118. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
119. The Quinlan court stated as follows: "[w]e have no doubt, in these unhappy

circumstances, that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval ...

and percep-

tive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the
life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death." Quinlan, 70 N.J.
at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. The Barber court, likewise, recognized Herbert's earlier request not
to "become another Karen Ann Quinlan." Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 493.
120. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1138, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 301
(1986).

1040

1987 / Bouvia v. Superior Court
therefore preserved to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances.' 2 ' Like Clarence Herbert, Elizabeth Bouvia expressed her

opinion that the benefits of the medical treatment did not outweigh

122
the burden of being kept alive through extraordinary means. The

holdings in Quinlan and Barber permitted the patient's family to
withdraw life-sustenance, based on an assumption of a desire, and

on the earlier-stated desire of the patient.

23

Denying Bouvia, a

competent adult, the right to make the same decision would indeed
24
be ironic.
2.

Refusing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Competent

Patients
25
The recent California case of Bartling v. Superior Court is

closely analogous to Bouvia. 126 At seventy years of age, William

Bartling died on the eve of appeal after months of litigation to
force doctors to disconnect his respirator.

27

The appellate court

agreed to hear the case as if Bartling's treatment was still at issue,
due to the lack of guidelines in the state law regulating the conduct
28 Bartling suffered
of hospitals in so-called "right-to-die" cases.

129
from a myriad of diseases, including a lung tumor. Although his

121. Id. at 1140, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 303 (citing President's Comm'n. for Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego LifeSustaining Treatment, A Report on the Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues in Treatment
Decisions (Mar. 1983)) (any surrogate, making a decision for the patient, ought to be guided
by knowledge of the patient's own desires and feelings). Id.
122. See id. at 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299. In discussing the availability
of immediate relief for Bouvia, the appellate court stated as follows:
entitled to respect. She has been
Her mental and emotional feelings are ...
subjected to the forced intrusion of an artificial mechanism into her body against
her will. She has a right to refuse the increased dehumanizing aspects of her
condition created by the insertion of a permanent tube through her nose and into
her stomach.
Id. at 1134, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
125. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984) (Bartling 1).
126. The appellate court in Bouvia found similarities between Bartling I and Bouvia on
the main issue of whether a competent adult patient, with serious illnesses which are probably
incurable, but have not been diagnosed as terminal, has the right, over the objections of
his physicians and the hospital, to have life-support equipment disconnected despite the fact
that withdrawal of such devices will surely hasten his death. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at
1138, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
127. Bartling 1, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
128. Id. The court stated in pertinent part that: "Itihe novel medical, legal and ethical
issues presented in this case are no doubt capable of repetition and therefore should not be
ignored by relying on the mootness doctrine. This requires us to set forth a framework in
which both the medical and legal professions can deal with similar situations." Id.
129. Id. At the time of his death, Bartling suffered from emphysema, chronic respiratory
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condition was considered to be serious, Bartling was not declared
to be terminal. 10 While in the hospital, Bartling executed and
submitted a living will"' and a durable power of attorney, 32 both

of which expressed his desire to be allowed to die and not be kept
alive by medications or artificial means.133 The hospital questioned

Bartling's ability to make a meaningful decision because he had

vacillated more than once from his position of wanting the respirator
34
removed. 1
The appellate court overturned the decision of the trial court which
had held that the right to have life-support equipment disconnected
was limited to comatose and terminally ill patients, or to their represen-

tatives.' Using a balancing test broader than that articulated in
Quinlan and Barber, the appellate court asked whether the right of
a competent adult to refuse unwanted medical treatment was out-

weighed by the societal interests in the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of third parties, and the maintenance

failure, arteriosclerosis, abdominal aneurysm (abnormal ballooning of the main artery passing
through the abdomen to the legs), and a malignant tumor of the lung. Bartling also had a
history of what his physicians termed "chronic acute anxiety/depression" and alcoholism.
Id. at 189-90, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
130. Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
131. A living will is a written directive by an adult patient authorizing the withholding
or withdrawal of extraordinary life-sustaining procedures in the situation of terminal illness.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1987). Bartling's living will stated in
pertinent part as follows: "If at such time the situation should arise in which there is no
reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct
that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by medications, artificial means or heroic
measures." Bartling 1, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 190, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
132. The Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act enables a designated proxy
to terminate health care if the principal is incompetent. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§
2430-2443 (West Supp. 1987). In his durable power of attorney, Bartling stated in part as
follows:
I am totally unable to care for myself, and believe that I am dependent on a
mechanical ventilator to support and sustain my respiration and life. I continuously
suffer agonizing discomfort, pain and the humiliating indignity of having to have
my every bodily need and function tended to by others. I do not wish to continue
to live under these conditions. It is therefore my intent to refuse to continue on
ventilator support and thereby to permit the natural process of dying to occurpeacefully, privately and with dignity.
Bartling 1, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 191, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
133. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
134. Bartling 1, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The appellate court
found no question that Bartling was legally competent to decide whether he wanted to have
the respirator disconnected. Apparently unconcerned with Bartling's vacillation, the court
stated as follows: "The fact that, Mr. Bartling periodically wavered from this position
because of severe depression or for any other reason does not justify the conclusion of
Glendale Adventist and his treating physicians that his capacity to make such a decision
was impaired to the point of legal incompetency." Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223-24.
135. Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
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of medical ethics.' 36 The court found these moral and ethical objections were not sufficient to abridge Bartling's constitutionally
7
guaranteed right to privacy.' 31 The court relied upon the Massachusetts
38
decision in Superindendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,' which held
39
the individual right to privacy superior to all competing interests.'
The Saikewicz court found that the constitutional right to privacy preserved the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination
140 Under this view, the court
as fundamental constituents of life.
noted, the value of life is decreased by the failure to allow a
competent human being the right to choose, not by the patient's
141
decision to refuse treatment. The Bouvia court used the Bartling
I balancing test to hold that the decision to forego medical treatment
means is a guaranteed right
of life-support through 1 mechanical
42
belonging to the patient.

B.

Suicide

The trial court in Bouvia found that Bouvia's request for relief
1 43
was motivated by an intent to commit suicide in the hospital. In
England, suicide was a crime under common law and generally
considered a form of murder.'4 With the sole exception of a
Massachusetts statute enacted in 1600,145 the English attitude has
been expressly rejected in the United States and suicide has never
46
been punished in this country.1 Currently, no state, including
a crime.' 47
California, has a statute making a successful suicide
1 48
Attempted suicide was also a crime at common law. The majority of states, including California, impose no criminal liability
136. Id. at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224. Cf. supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text
(Quinlan balancing test). See also supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (asserted state
interests).
137. Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193-94, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
138. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
139. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
140. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
141. Id.
142. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (1986).
143. Id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
144. See Note, The Punishment of Suicide-A Need for Change, 14 VILL. L. REv. 463
(1969). The usual punishment for suicide was burial on the public highway with a stake
driven through the body and forfeiture of the suicide's property to the crown. Id. at 465.
145. Id. at 465. This statute provided for burial of the suicide on the highway with a
warning to others to beware of such "damnable practices." Id.
146. Id.
147. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 433, 667 P.2d 1176, 1178, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163,
165 (1983).
148. Id.
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upon one who attempts to commit suicide. 49 Under current psychiatric views, attempted suicide is considered a symptom of mental
illness, requiring medical or psychiatric treatment. 50 In support of
these views, the Model Penal Code provides that no form of
punishment is acceptable for a successful suicide.'' The Model
Penal Code also states that criminal punishment for attempted
suicide, likewise, is ineffective to deter others from attempting to
take their own lives. 152
Although attempted suicide is not a crime in the United States,
courts have recognized a state interest in the prevention of irrational
self-destruction.51 Addressing this interest, the court in Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz noted that a competent adult's
refusal of medical treatment does not necessarily constitute suicide
because the patient may not have the specific intent to die. 5 4 Even
if the intent to die existed, the patient would not be actively setting
the death-producing agent in motion when death is the result of
natural causes. 55 The Saikewicz court therefore concluded no connection existed between the refusal to submit to medical treatment
5 6 Despite
and any state concern to prevent suicide.Y
the trial court's
contention in Bouvia that Bouvia intended to commit suicide, the
appellate court viewed her refusal of medical treatment not as a
decision to commit suicide, but as a desire to live out the remainder
of her natural life in dignity and peace. 15 7
The rationale of the trial court's finding of Bouvia's intent to
commit suicide appears not only to assert a state interest in the
prevention of suicide, 5 8 but also to show that Bouvia's refusal of
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 434, 667 P.2d at 1178, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 (Official Draft 1980).
Id. The Model Penal Code also states, in part as follows:

It seems preposterous to argue that the visitation of criminal sanctions upon one
who fails in the effort is likely to inhibit persons from undertaking a serious
attempt to take their own lives. Moreover, it is clear that the intrusion of the
criminal law into such tragedies is an abuse. There is a certain moral extravagance

in imposing criminal punishment on a person who has sought his own self-

destruction, who has not attempted direct injury to anyone else, and who more
properly requires medical or psychiatric attention.

Id. comment 2.

153. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425; Bartling I, 163 Cal. App.
3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225.
154. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
158. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (the four state interests asserted by
the physicians and hospital administrators in Bouvia).
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medical treatment placed the hospital and staff in the position of
19
aiding and abetting her suicide. Although suicide is not illegal in
California, California Penal Code section 401 expressly makes as160
In the 1983
sisting another to commit suicide a criminal offense.
case of In re Joseph G., the California Supreme Court distinguished
6
aiding and abetting suicide from murder.' ' In Joseph G., two high
school students became intoxicated and decided to commit suicide
together. 62 Joseph would drive his car over a cliff with Jeff as a4
either boy1
passenger.1 6 There was no evidence of coercion by
65 Noting a paucity of
The plan was carried out, but only Jeff died.
decisions on the issue, 66 the court examined in depth whether the
survivor who drove the vehicle was guilty of aiding and abetting
67
suicide rather than the murder of his deceased partner.
The court held that murder requires active participation in the
68 Aiding and abetting
final overt act causing the victim's death.
suicide, on the other hand, presumes assistance short of active
participation. 69 Criminal courts have characterized the difference
between the crimes of murder and of assisting suicide as the dif70
ference between furnishing the means, and active participation.

If the defendant merely furnished the means, he is guilty of aiding

159. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06.
160. Penal Code § 401 provides as follows: "Every person who deliberately aids, or
advises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 401 (West 1970).
161. In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 667 P.2d 1176, 194 Cal. Rptr. 163 (1983).
162. Id. at 432, 667 P.2d at 1177, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 439, 667 P.2d at 1182, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
165. Id. at 432, 667 P.2d at 1178, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
166. Id. at 435, 667 P.2d at 1179, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
167. Id. at 438, 667 P.2d at 1181, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 168. The court noted that California
law provided no options, save first degree murder at one extreme, or aiding and abetting
suicide at the other extreme. Id.
168. Id. at 436, 667 P.2d at 1180, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
169. Id. For example, in People v. Bouse, 199 Or. 676, 264 P.2d 800 (1953), defendant's
wife drowned in the bathtub. On the evidence, the jury could have found that defendant
committed murder by holding his wife's head underwater, despite a struggle, until she died.
The jury could also have found that the defendant merely ran the water and assisted his
wife into the tub, and was therefore guilty only of manslaughter under the Oregon assisting
statute. Id. at 687, 264 P.2d at 805.
170. See People v. Matlock, 51 Cal. 2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959). Defendant was
convicted of murder and robbery. Although he admitted that he strangled the victim and
took his money, the defendant claimed he did so solely at the victim's insistence. According
to the defendant, the victim sought a way to die but could not commit suicide without
forfeiting the benefits of his insurance policy. The victim therefore induced the defendant
Id. at
to kill him and take his property so the death would appear to be a robbery-murder.
687, 336 P.2d at 507.
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a suicide.171 If, however, he actively participated in the death of the
72
suicide victim, he is guilty of murder.
In Joseph G., Joseph had control of the instrumentality (auto-

mobile) which proximately killed Jeff. 173 However, the court found
that the active-passive distinction between acts did not apply when

suicides were undertaken simultaneously by a single instrumental74

ity. Therefore, Joseph could be charged with no more than aiding
and abetting in Jeff's suicide. 75 Clearly, the facts of Joseph G. did

not pertain to a patient's request for the removal of life-sustaining
treatment by medical personnel. Joseph G. is, however, significant to Bouvia by showing that the instances and means of assisting
another to commit suicide require an affirmative act on the part of
76

the accused.1
The Bartling I opinion noted that several of Bartling's doctors
had expressed the view that disconnecting the respirator would have
been tantamount to aiding his suicide. 77 The court distinguished

bringing about Bartling's death by unnatural means and merely

hastening his inevitable death by natural means.1 78 According to the

court, disconnection of the respirator would have allowed Bartling

to die a natural death.

case, 180

79

Using the language from the Saikewicz

the Bartling I court assured the physicians that their part
in the disconnection of Bartling's respirator would not constitute
an assistance of his suicide.' 8' The court in Bouvia relied on the

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d at 439, 667 P.2d at 1182, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
174. Id. at 440, 667 P.2d at 1183, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 170. The court noted that Joseph's
fate could have been the same as Jeff's. Yet, had Jeff survived, the most he could have
been charged with would have been aiding and abetting suicide, because he did not participate
in the final act of driving the automobile. Id. at 439, 667 P.2d at 1182-83, 194 Cal. Rptr.
at 169.
175. Id. at 440, 667 P.2d at 1183, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
176. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306
(1986). Examples of affirmative conduct considered to be aiding and abetting suicide include
furnishing a gun, poison, knife, or other instrumentality with which the would-be suicide
could physically and immediately inflict some death-producing injury. Id.
177. Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 417. See supra notes 154-56 and
accompanying text (postulating that a patient's refusal of medical treatment does not
necessarily constitute the intent to commit suicide).
181. Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226. The court also quelled
the hospital and physicians' fear that their compliance with Bartling's wishes might subject
them to criminal and civil liability, noting that the holding of Barber effectively precludes
any criminal liability in these circumstances. Without further explanation, the Bariling I
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opinions in Joseph G. and Bartling I to conclude that Elizabeth
Bouvia made a conscious decision to simply let nature take its
course. 8 2 The mere presence of her physicians did not constitute
the requisite affirmative, assertive, proximate, and direct conduct
3
of aiding and abetting suicide. '

III.

LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

The recent decisions of the California Courts of Appeal have
evidenced a progression in the attitude of the California courts
toward granting wider latitude to patients seeking to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment. The 1972 California Supreme Court
case of Cobbs v. Grant laid the foundation for the exercise of the
the
right of refusal by stating that an adult of sound mind had
8 4 The
treatment.
medical
right to determine whether to submit to

California Court of Appeal for the Second District, in Barber v.
Superior Court, found the obvious corollary to the Cobbs principle,

that a person could determine whether to accept medical treatment,

was that a competent adult had a legal right to refuse medical

treatment.' 85 In Barber, prosecution of physicians arose after life86
comatose patient.
support measures were withdrawn from a deeply
87

his
In view of the patient's dismal prognosis for recovery' and
8 the
withdrawn,
be
treatment
family's request that life-sustaining
court concluded that the physicians did not act improperly by

withdrawing essential medical treatment.

89 One

year after the Barber

decision, the Court of Appeal for the Second District was presented

90
with the case of Bartling v. Superior Court. Seventy year old

Bartling was alert and competent, but required a life-support device

to remain alive. 191 Although Bartling had not been diagnosed as
if Mr. Bartling
court went on to state, "we are now satisfied the law as outlined is clear and
out his
had lived, real parties could not have been criminally or civilly liable for carrying
instructions." Id. at 197, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
182. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
183. Id. at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
See
184. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972).
supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (discussion of the Cobbs case).
489
185. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
case).
Barber
the
of
(discussion
text
accompanying
and
(1983). See supra notes 104-18
186. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
187. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
188. Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
189. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
125-37 and
190. 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984). See supra notes
accompanying text (discussion of the Bartling I case).
191. Bartling 1, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
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terminal, he had a prognosis of less than one year to live at the
time he sought removal of the life-support device. 92 The court held
that Bartling had the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment
under his constitutional right of privacy. 191

Claiming a factual similarity between the cases, the Court of
Appeal for the Second District used the Bartling I rationale to grant
an injunction for the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment
based on the patient's constitutional right to privacy in Bouvia v.
1 94

Superior Court.

Unlike Bartling, however, Bouvia was twenty-

eight years old at the time of the ruling' 9 and had a potential of
living an additional fifteen to twenty years. 196 Although both Bar-

tling and Bouvia appeared cognizant, functional, and self-determined, Bartling wished to live, but under his own power,'
while
Bouvia wished to deprive her body of its life-sustaining capabilities
through starvation.1 98
The trend developed by California courts has effectively sanc-

tioned the commission of suicide by the refusal of life-sustaining
medical treatment in cases where the patient is comatose, 99 near
death, 2°0 and, as a result of Bouvia, in a condition where the quality
of life has been diminished to the point of "meaningless exist-

ence. ' ' 20 ' Reflecting on the trend, from Barberto Bouvia, a question

arises as to how far California courts will be willing to extend the
right to refuse medical treatment. Will the courts, for example,
grant an injunction against the force-feeding of a physically healthy

individual who has determined that the quality of life has diminished

to the point of "hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability, and frus-

192. Id. Bartling was not considered to be terminal because his physicians had determined
that Bartling could live for at least one year if he was weaned from the respirator.
The
physicians were of the opinion, however, that successful weaning was unlikely
due to
Bartling's mental and physical problems. Id. at 192, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
193. Id. at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
194. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1137-38, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301.
195. Id. at 1135, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
196. Id. at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
197. Bartling I, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
198. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06. The court noted
that
Bouvia's request connoted a decision on her part to "allow nature to take its course."
Id.
at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306. A question remains, however, as to whether
deliberate
starvation can be equated with a natural death which ensues when the lungs can no
longer
function absent mechanical means, and breathing terminates.
199. See Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484.
200. See Bartling 1, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220.
201. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142-43, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. Advancing Bouvia's
view, the court stated that, "the quality of her life has been diminished to the
point of
helplessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration." Id.
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tration? '202 Further, will the California courts extend the right to
control one's own body so far as to sanction euthanasia, as suggested by the concurrence? 2 3
204
In 1982, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
was presented with a case which had the potential of extending the
constitutional right of privacy to include the right of a physically
healthy individual to intentionally die of starvation. Declining to
broaden this right, the New York Supreme Court, in Von Holden
v. Chapman,20 5 authorized the force-feeding of an in-mate at the
Attica Correctional Facility.20 6 Mark David Chapman, while serving
a sentence of twenty years to life for the murder of former Beatle
20 7
John Lennon, expressed an intention to take his life by starvation.
Like Bouvia, Chapman was declared to be competent and fully
203 Also,
informed of the fatal consequences of his refusal to eat.
like Bouvia, Chapman claimed a constitutional right to privacy and
argued that state intervention was an unwarranted denial of his
constitutional rights. 20 9 However, the Von Holden court found that
the right to privacy did not include the right to commit suicide,
since only personal rights that can be deemed to be "fundamental"
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" fall under the
210
constitutional guarantee of privacy. The court found an obligation
of the state to protect the health and welfare of persons in its care
facility. 211
and custody, including Chapman who resided in a state
The court, therefore, found that societal21 2interest outweighed the
constitutional privacy rights of Chapman.
Pursuant to the ruling in Bouvia, a California court might have
found Chapman's right to privacy in refusing medical treatment to

202. Id. See also Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
203. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
204. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divison operates at the same jurisdictional
level as the court of appeal in California.
205. 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1982).
206. Id. at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25. At the time of the court's decision, Chapman
had been temporarily transferred to the Psychiatric Center upon the certification of two
examining physicians that he was suffering from a mental condition likely to result in serious
harm to himself. Id. at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
207. Id. at 67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25.
210. Id. at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
211. Id. at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25.
212. Id. at 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The court upheld an order at Special Term which
authorized the Director of the New York Psychiatric Center to "take all steps necessary to
force-feed Chapman in order to sustain his life." Id. at 66-67, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 624-25.
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outweigh the societal interests, and therefore grant an injunction
against any force-feeding. Although, unlike Bouvia, Chapman is
relatively healthy, 2 3 the prospects of spending twenty years to life
in prison is likely to be considered, at least by Chapman, an ordeal 21 4
from which death would be a welcome relief. Von Holden, therefore, seems a plausible extension of Bouvia. As in Bouvia, Chapman's refusal of medical treatment (force-feeding) allows nature to
simply take its course.21 5
The concurrence in Bouvia would appear to extend the trend
toward granting wider latitude of self-termination by permitting an
individual to actively aid and abet another's suicide. The concurring
opinion of Justice Compton asserted that the penal sanctions imposed on persons who aid and abet suicide 216 are archaic and
inhumane.217 The concurrence found unequivocally that Bouvia
wanted to die, and if she had had the physical ability to do so, she
would have taken her own life. 21 8 Justice Compton observed that
an integral part of the right to control one's destiny includes the
right to die. 21 9 This right should include, according to the concurrence, the ability of the patient to enlist assistance from others,
including the medical profession, in making death as painless and
quick as possible. 220 The assistance request should not be thwarted
by the threat of penal sanctions against those who would help. 22'

213. There is at least a question of Chapman's mental health. See supra note 206 and
accompanying text.
214. The Bouvia court described Bouvia's plight, in part, as follows:
Her mind and spirit may be free to take great flights but she herself is imprisoned
and must I& physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by her helplessness. We do not believe it
is the po cy of this State that all and every life must be preserved against the will
of the s , fferer. It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical practitioners to
assert their right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or more accurately,
endure, for "15 to 20 years." We cannot conceive it to be the policy of this State
to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone.
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (1986).
215. See id. at 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
216. CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1970). See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
217. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1146, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
218. Id. at 1146-47, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307. The concurring opinion postulated that
Bouvia has to "stultify her position before this court by disavowing her desire to end her
life in such a fashion and proclaiming that she will eat all that she can physically tolerate"
to obtain assistance in ending her life. Moreover, the concurrence notes that "[e]ven
the
majority opinion here must necessarily 'dance' around the issue." Id. at 1147, 225 Cal.
Rptr. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. The concurrence stated in part, as follows:
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The concurring opinion further recognized that the Hippocratic
Oath222 speaks directly against a physician assisting another's suicide. 223 The concurrence points out that the Hippocratic Oath also
proscribes the performance of abortion, yet the medical profession
224
has already accomodated a deviation from that part of the oath.
Under this rationale, the concurrence asserts that the medical profession should, therefore, be permitted to225provide the same accomodation to a patient who wishes to die.
A definite trend of granting wider latitude toward self-termination
has been evidenced in recent rulings of the California Courts of

Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and informed choice that she prefers
death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, intolerable condition. I
believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that decision. This state and the
medical profession, instead of frustrating her desire, should be attempting to
relieve her suffering by permitting and in fact assisting her to die with ease and
dignity.

Id.

222. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL. DIcTIoNARY 650 (5th Unab. Law. ed. 1982) (defining "Hippocratic Oath" as "[a]n oath demanded of the physician about to enter upon the practice
of his profession").
223. The Hippocratic Oath reads in pertinent part as follows: "I will prescribe regimen
for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm
to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may
cause his death." Id.
224. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 308. A woman's right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy (under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its
progeny), does not, however, compel a doctor to perform an abortion. The Health and
Safety Code states in part that "[n]o such employee or person with staff privileges in a
hospital, facility, or clinic shall be subject to any penalty or discipline by reason of his
refusal to participate in an abortion." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955 (West Supp.
1986). If, therefore, a woman does not have the right to compel a doctor to perform an
abortion, a patient's right to die should likewise not compel a doctor to assist the effectuation
of a decision to commit suicide.
225. The concurrence does not suggest limiting the right to provide affirmative assistance
to another's suicide solely to members of the medical profession. Rather, the concurrence
states as follows: "That right should, in my opinion, include the ability to enlist assistance
from others, including the medical profession, in making death as painless and quick as
possible." Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (Compton, J.,
concurring). Although Justice Compton did not specify who was contemplated as others,
the discussion invokes strong implications on the issue of euthanasia. One could envisage a
number of scenarios in which assistance may be elicited to make death "as painless and
quick as possible;" for example, an elderly husband who can no longer bear to see his
cancer-stricken wife suffer the intolerable symptoms which accompany the disease. At her
urging, he determines that relief is the greatest gift of love he can give his wife and smothers
the life from her with a bed pillow. This kind of act, though one done out of love and not
malice, was recently held to be premeditated murder by a court in Florida. See Gilbert v.
State of Florida, 487 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming the first-degree
murder conviction of a 75 year old man who shot and killed his wife of 51 years to end
her suffering from osteoporosis and Alzheimer's Disease). To accept the tenets of the
concurrence, the husband's act would be a permissible assistance to one who "prefers death
to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, intolerable condition." Bouvia, 179 Cal.
App. 3d at 1147, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring).
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Appeal. Under the principle that a competent adult has the fundamental right to refuse even life-sustaining medical treatment,
California appellate courts have ordered the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment in Barber, when the patient was comatose
and terminal; in Battling I, when the patient required the use of a
respirator to remain alive; and in Bouvia, when the patient's physical
condition had severely reduced the quality of life. An argument has
been made that California courts may extend the trend of wider
latitude of self-termination to permit healthy, but unhappy individuals a comfortable environment in which to commit suicide. The
trend may even be extended to cases in which courts permit others
to assist another to die with ease and dignity without fear of criminal
reprisals, as suggested by the concurring opinion in Bouvia.
CONCLUSION

In Bouvia v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal for
the Second District permitted a patient to legally compel the hospital
staff to remove a nasogastric tube which was supplying her with
food and water. The court found that a nonterminal, competent
patient has a right to refuse medical treatment because of the
constitutional right to privacy, even when doing so creates a lifethreatening condition. Previously, California courts had permitted
the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment in cases in which
the patient was comatose or close to death. Bouvia, however, was
twenty-eight years old, with the potential for living another fifteen
to twenty years. Despite the trial court's determination that Bouvia
was attempting to commit suicide with the assistance of the hosptial
staff, the court of appeal found the lower court rationale to be
unfounded. According to the appellate court, Bouvia's exercise of
her fundamental right to refuse medical treatment permitted her to
die of natural means. The appellate court further found that the
mere presence of Bouvia's physicians while she refused medical
treatment did not constitute the act of aiding and abetting another's
suicide. An examination of California opinions concerning a patient's refusal to submit to life-sustaining medical treatment reveals
a trend toward providing greater latitude to courts concerning the
kinds of cases to which the right to refuse essential medical treatment may be applied. An argument was posed that a individual
may invoke the constitutional right of privacy to commit suicide by
starvation while incarcerated in a state penal facility. Extending the
trend of permitting self-termination to an extreme, the concurring
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opinion makes the suggestion that the courts should permit a person
to affirmatively assist another to die with ease and dignity.
Lorna A. Voboril
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